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·r~is topic has been dealt wjth in three parts . 
fart (A) looks at the need for control of ~onopoly and 
merFers in modern society , endinF with a brief examination o.f 
the backcround to the Australian 'I rade l'rac tices Ac L. 
I art (ll) is concerned witli mere;er control; the first 
section deals wi tl1 AustraJ ian rnetbods of control , the second 
part examines retrulations in 1 ew 'ealand . 
rinally , lart (c) deals with the complex question of 
uonopoly control and the closely related question of' autLorization 
and clearance in Australia , and· tlle public interest' in 1 m,-
Zealand . 
l ART A . 
1-n 1 TI ERE IS A , EED lt'OH COl THOL 
Tbe evils of' onopoly and r,err·ers accordine; to Senator L . 
1' urphy , Q. C . are clear . ( 1) "1 ost of' them " he said , "are 
undesirable and 1 ave served the interest of tl1e parties eng·a~ed 
in them irrespective of 1iliether those interests coincide with 
the interes Ls of' Australian.s generally . These practices cause 
prices to be maintained at artificially hie;h levels . They enable 
particular enterprises or groups o.f enterprises to attain positions 
o.f economic dominance which are then susceptible to abuse they 
allow f'or discriminatory action affainst smalJ business , exploit -
ation of consumers and feather bcddinc- o.f industry ." 
( 1 ) SpeecJ1 hy Senator the I on . L . I • 1 urphy Q. C . on Trade 
Practices ill , Second eadinr- p . 1- 2 (From the ' Parliamentary 
Debates ' JO ,July 197L1 - published by 1" . D . Atkinson , Covernment 
1 rinter , C'anberrva_. t ·- , ,., ,•f('ttity 0.1 
lC Ol • · -~ I ! f \ It,. rl 
v, '""' 
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A competitive market is characterised by impersonal 
marl·et control . Firms in a competitive market are compelled 
to follow econo, icaJJ.y feasil)le lines of tradine; due to 
constraints of the market that arc imposed upon them . 
l l ti,:wtely continuous down1'"ard pressure is exerted on prices , 
lowering the margin of profit until it is just sufficient to 
induce entrepreneurs to remain in the market . (2) r ut in a 
market dominated by one firf'l or a small number of firms in 
,,:hich there are hir;h barriers to entry there is no such 
pressure . Apart :from the fear of attracting competi tars , 
throuch high profit returns there is nothing theoretically to 
constrain a monopolist or dominant firm from charr,in{?' a price 
well in excess of mar~jnal cost or from restrictin~ his output , 
thing s ,,hicl1 firms in a competitive market cannot do , and tllus 
reaping monopoJy profit . esid es the eff'ec t on prices and 
profits tliere may be other consequences of' anti - competitive 
s true ture , for example , , ·b enever a f'irf'l is larvc i.n relation 
to tl1e jndustry in ·whic1 1 it operates , it has the po,-1er to change 
its o ·wn P1arket environment and hence to ree;ulate to some extent 
t1,e l·inds of competition to whicJ• it may be subject . 
Secondly , wr1ere a :firm is sheltered by a monopolistic 
position in a market it has no need to produce novel or innovative 
r oods . The ausence or ,,eakeninp; of competition meru1s that there 
"h'ill be little market pressure on the monopolist f'irrn to be ~ 
economi.c al and .feasible , i . e ., to Jrcep down costs . astef'ul 
costs can be ref'l ec ted in higl er prices just as much as rionopoly 
proI'i ts can . ' ,ut perhaps the rr1ost obvious result of' a monopoly 
or near monopoly .is that tl1e 11onopolist can kill competition i:f 
(2) or a fuller discussion see J aysen and Turner Anti Trust 
Policy (1959) pp15-1 6 . 
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he fixes prices ,,l1ich drive liis competitors out of business and 
leave him in sole control of' the market; with nothing to stop 
hi1r :risin{r prices at will; to the ultimate disadvantar·e of the 
consul'1er . 
In conclusion , P.10nopolisat Lon appears to ensure that 
consumers have less choi cc in buyint: , that the monopolist bas 
no pressure to cut costs by eff'icie11cy because of' a lack of 
cor1 e tit ion , :for consumers wi 11 depend on the firm dee is ions , 
not only as reeards prices but also on such matters (J) as the 
a1ro1.mt and directions of research and development in the relevant 
industry , the services offered and conLinuity of' supply , with 
tbe result of inevitable governmental intervention aF,ainst 
r·1onopoly and mergers f'lo,;1in[; from a recor,ni tion that automatic 
control once tbou["ht to be irnplici t in laissez- f'aire competition 
will fail . ivl1y? ~ecause of the encroachment on the freedom oi' 
the 1,1 arket place by bigger and lligger enterprises resulting in 
the control o.f the market slippinr; in to tbe hands o.f fewer and 
f'e,,rer enablinr; these enterprises to attain positions of economic 
dominance in a marl·et which to use tl1e words of Senator urphy 
"arc susceptible to abuse 11 (Li) . 
1"reedorr: of' cor.1peti tion is accepted in the mainstream of 
contemporary economic thinl·ing as a hi[)lly desirable objective 
because conpetitive r:1arkets: 
(a) 1 ost eff'iclent.ly allocate resources to the uses J'or which 
they are best suited; 
(b) Encourac:e ef'f'·iciency, prorrcssivcness and innovati o n in the 
use of resources; and 
( J) 
( L1 ) 
ibid 
::ipeecl: by Senator the , on . L . 1 • 
ill , Second I eading p . 1- 2 (""'ror• 
JO July 1G7li - pub.lished by F . D . 
Canberra . 
urph_ Q. C . on Trade l ractices 
the ' l arliamentary Debates ' 
Atkinson , Covcrnment ~rinter , 
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( c) Con tributes to tl1e e::i.ui table redistribution oi' wealth 
ariong consumers and fac tars of production . ( 5) 
Some Cor 1ments on t:he Approach taJ·en in the Australian T . 1" . A . 
The pro"ltibition contained in Part IV (Hestrictive Trade 
Practices Act) (for our purposes -,ection 46 and Section 50) are 
based in a larce part on the United States Sherman and Clayton 
Acts . 'L'he Sherman Act of 1890 aimed at restraint of trade and 
r,1011.opolies , the Clayton Act 1 911.J (hut subsequently amended) 
ree;ulates several kinds of anti- competitive transactions and 
mergers . If the Australian Act met with the same degree of 
success as the American legislation has , Fhat was said by the 
U . S . S . C . in ::-orth I acific Rail Co v . TS (6) sums up well the 
long term results of such legislation . The Court said: "The 
Sherman Act was aimed at preserving free and unf'ettered 
co11petition as the rule of trade . It rests on the premise that 
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the 
~est allocation of our economic reso11rces , the lowest price , the 
hir;hest quality and the greatest material progress while at the 
same time providinF, an environment conclusive to the preservation 
of' our democratic , politic al and social institutions . " 'l'his is 
perhaps Going a little too far in that there is nothing in the 
Sherman Act provisions to ensure that it operates to pro duce 
optimum ec onomic results . On the contrary , the Courts have 
consistently refused to take economic consequences as the criterion 
o.f right and wronc- - even l'irst class economic performance is no 
defence once an intent to mono polize is established . 
(5) 
(6) 
See for example - ,'eport of' the Australian Attorney- < eneral ' s 
J ational Corrmittee to .-,tudy the Anti - mrust Law ( 1955)pp3 17 - 3 1 9. 
- J aysen and 'f'urner , Anti - Trust l olicv pp 11 - 19 . 
lake a.11.d ., • ones , In Def'ence of' Anti "'rust ( 1965) 
65 Colum . L . ev . 377 at J8 1-384 . 
- !runt , elislation in Search of' an Obje c tive ( 1965) 
Li- 1 .LCon . l,ec . 357 at pp 363- J64 . 
especially V • • orah onopolies and restrictive practice s 
at p . 20- 28 . 
3 5 6 - ;:, L: ( 1 9 5 , 
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JikeFisc it can be inferred from tr1e .Australian Act that 
its purpose is to r1aintain and foster competition . And it must 
ensure l;liat cor1petition is not eJini.nated or reduced by monopoly , 
(and its r•ain method o:f' development..,rnergers , ) in short the 
ohjectLve is to create conditions that ensure there are enoug 
participants in a given field so viable c o r1petition can exist . 
ln view· of these desirable results it micht seem feasible to 
simply cracl· dov.n on monopoly as it appears and stamp it out 
like a disease . ut this method has its problems . The nere 
acq dsi ion of a monopoly position may be blameless - it may 
be the result of successful inovation; or the outcome of the 
type o:f efficient competitiveness tbat anti- monopoly is designed 
to encourap c . 
T e Tnited States has avoided this problem by taking "intent 
to monopolize" as a yard s Lick . r ·onopoly power as such is no 
oi'f'cnce; it is either to exploit monopoly power or to build and 
maintain it . The of.fence lies in conduct ·which reveals that a 
firm likes Lo Lave , and means to keep , its power . 
Y c t as H • r, ax t and runt point out (7) "the Act is 
Australian and not Amerjcan . " F or Part I 7 (dealing ·with 
restrictive T rade P ractices) to {"cther with Part V.l (enforcement 
and reri1ed:i.es) rmst al1..,ays be read in conjunction witli Part VlI 
(011 authorizations and clearance) . or unLike the American 
approacl1 , anti- compet.L ti ve r:1erc ers prohibited by the languar;e of 
Section 50 , arc offered the possi b ility o.f protection by way of 
prior authorization . The Australian .t Ct attempts to combine a 
c eneral lc c islativo pro11ibition enf'orced by t h e Court with an 
administrative procedure :f'or authorization of non - cor1peti tive 
conduct in certain areas . 
(7) 1,ritin r; in Australian l'us.Lness Jaw Hcview Vol . 2 o . 1 (April 
1 97 L1 ) 
- 6 -
One of' the rnaln advantages o.f the Australian approach will 
be the establishment of specific prohibitions and presumptions 
:in re] at ion to mononolies and mergers ,·hicb will be kno,·m ,·i th 
reasonable certainty and 1·:ill be to a considerable extent self-
enf' ore ing . 
As A . D • I e ale Fro t e ( 8 ) there are two advantages about 
clear cxceptionless provisions: 
(a) Tl1ey ensure that the law will be enforced by the lm·.ryers 
advisine· businessmen so the bulk of' tbe enforcement problem 
is overcome this way; 
(l) These clear and easily understood prohibitions are fair to 
the business community which knows vhere it stands and what 
arc the limits ,,1 ich must not be overstepped . ~o economic 
inquir_r or adrninistrattve tribunal can be expected to 
provide a bas is :for general rules o.f this 1-ind . 
PAH'l' I 
Tl E AUSTRAL.LAN LETLOD or J Ef' FR COVl'l'OL 
The aim o:f Section 50 is to control the foJlovine types 
of mere;ers . 
Section 50 eq:::ers - ('l'ypes of' :r ereer . ) 
( a) '1'he evils o.r J orizontaJ t err,·ers ( ,,:here one co, 1pany acquires 
all or part of' the stock or assets of' another company 
o:f:ferinp tlie same poods in the same market) are obvious -
the reP1ovaJ of' n competi t,:>r and t11us a lessenine; of overall 
competition with tl1c possible result in inef'f'iciency and tl1e 
opportunity i'or mnrket d omination by one f'irm . 
A. D. 
(2nd 
caJe , Anti Trust r~ws o:f t1e lnited States 
1 ,d • C • f • f • 1 97 0 ) 
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( b) Vert ic a]. errrers occur i·'here one company takes over a 
present customer , or supplier . '1'he effects are a possible 
foreclosure of competit o rs :from a market or acress to 
suppliers , j tJ1 tlle result tl1at the intcerated f'irrn can 
i11po se a "supply squeeze" or a "price squee7,e" on non -
in ter;ra ted snpp.liers . 
Confflornera te i.ere:ers - 1vl1 ich "'re of three kinds . 
(:i) marl·et extension rnerL,ers , the result o:f a rncr,o-er 
(ii) 
(iii) 
between cor ,panies selling the same product in two 
diff'ercnt r·eorraphic ma kets . 
product extension mergers - between companies selling 
related or complementary products (e . g . the purchase 
by a soap povder manuf'ac turer of' a company rnc:.nu:fac turing 
liquid bleach) . 
and pure coni9:lomerate f'lerr:ers (9) . 
Section 50 on tlle face of it , applies to all three types 
oJ' merger . ut Section 50 does not apply to acquisition by a 
person or entity i·'hict1 is not a corporation as def'ined in Section 
4 , and acquisition by an indi victual ,mulct not co11e within Section 
50 . The proposed Clause 60 in the Commerce ,ill de.finitely 
applies to the three types of' merger outlined above - the opening 
,vords read: "subject to Section 60A of' this Act written notice 
of everv proposed merc;cr or takeover shall be given to the 
examiner . " (Clause 60A lists the types of' merger to which Clause 
60 does not apply . ) 
Also the entity whose shares or assets are acquired must 
under Section 50 "be a body corporate" and there i.s no extension 
to include individuals . 
(9) based on classification of J . R. Ievine writing in TI~e 
,\ustralian Law ,.,ournal Vol 47 p . 679 at p . 707 
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A merr;er is prohibited by Section 50 if jts likely effect 
will be to substantially lessen competition in a market . The 
clearance procedure in Section 9Li will enable partj es to a 
proposed merver to obtain the Conmission ' s opinion on the 
application of' Section 50 to their mere-er . \{here a marger is 
covered hy ~ection 50 it will be possible for the parties to 
seel an autborization from the Commission to proceed with their 
nere-er if' it is justified (these provisions contained in Part VlJ 
,,,ill be examined in more detail J ater) . Crenerally speakin[~ , an 
authorization depends on proof that the proposed course of 
action will result in a substantial benefit to the public , being 
a benefit that would not otherwise be available . It is interesting 
Tt, ,.c,'t,e 
at tl1is point i'that ~ ew Zealand has adopted a similar approach as 
can be seen from examining Clause 60 of the Commerce 1 ill . 1 or 
in determinin[" whether any proposed mer{""er or takeover is likely 
to be contrary to the public interest , as in Australia , regard 
is to be had to any econonic effects which any proposed merger 
or takeover are likely to have on the 11ell- beine,- of' 1',ew Zealand , 
which ,10uld not take place in the absence of' the merger . 
The difference between a "clearance" and an 11 authorization 11 
is ti:t:a:1± as Senator Lurphy has pointed out ( 10) ±::s that a clearance 
results in the Act being treated as inapplicable , while the latter 
assumes the ,,et to ue applicable but grants a dispensation . 11 To 
put it another uay , the el:'fect o.f' an authorization is t o permit 
persons to ene;aec in conduct otherwise prohibited , a clearance 
protects persons from e1Jforcement action . 
( 1 0) .::ipeech by Senator the on . L . l . 1urphy Q. C . on Trade 
ractices l'ill , Second ··eadine at p . J parae;raphs 8 -1 0 
( 'rom the 'Parliamentary Debates' JO July 1974 - published 
by ... . ,) . Atkinson , C overnr:ient l rinter , Canberra . ) 
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.hat constitutes a mercer vithin Section 50 . 
l f' the Australian "'rade J rac tic es Comr1ission follows the 
approacl1 of tllc A11erican Court , Section 50 will cover the 
acquisitions of intanp:ible property such as patents , trade 
,rarks , or contract riR"rts <1> f the acquisition substantially 
lesseninc competition . ( 11) 
Second] y , the words "directly or indirectly" would serve 
to catch an acquisition effected throue;h the medium of' some 
other entity . It is clear that the Australian Act covers 
Lake overs by 171eans of shares pL,rchasecl on the Stock 1•,xchange , 
as for exar:iple in the recent case of Vavass eurs Lid for ' ~ • . • A . 
Thirdly , the method of one company purchasinc the assets 
of' a other company leaving the company whose assets have been 
purchased in the forn of a hollow shell is clearly within 
Section 50 . 
ut it is far from clear whether notification of this type 
of mer[;er need be E; iven under Clause 60 o.f the 'T e,; , ealand 
Commerce ill . Clause 60 reads "Subject to S ection 60A of this 
Act written notice of every proposed 1,1crr:;er or takeover shall 
b e g iven" valid arcuments could be made out based in the word 
every for and agah1st its application to such takeovers . Clause 
59 1 (a) defines a merg er as a transaction 1'.'llich rcsul ts in any 
two or nore enterprises ceasine to be distinct enterprises . The 
probleP1 is that such a takeover uould be the result of a series 
o :f share-purchasing transactions i'rom many separate shareholders 
in tlJe Conpany . Cl-=-use 59 1(a) merely talks o.f "a transaction 
vh ich results in 11 
( 1 1 ) Sec l S v Lever I ros Co 216 P . Supp (c . S.D.N. Y. ) 1963 
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J:ut takeovers by means of share purchasing on the sto ck 
exchai1-r-e would require not.ificat ion i f' CJause 59 1 (a) is to be 
read in conjunction with Clause 59 1 (b) which dei'ines the ,'ord 
enterprise as nsed jn Clause 59 1 (a) . 'J.'wo or more enterprises 
are to be treaterl as ceasinF to be distinct if ••• they are 
hrouP•1-t by any means whatsoever under common ownership or c o ntrol . 
The phrase in C.lause 60A Subsection (2) " The ,.inister (of' 
Tro.de and Industry) r,1ay f'ror1 time to time by notice in the 
Gazette specify nny class of r1crGer or tak.eover as a class 
to which Section Go shall apply , 11 is of' more help , f o r there is 
notli Lne· to stop the , inister making use o:f the power conferred 
on hi1:i by this Sub- section to require notice to be given pursuan.t 
to Sec ti.on 60 of tl ese types of' takeovers . Secondly , it would 
1)e nossible f'or the .. inister under CJ ause 60B to controJ 
tal covers v:ia these metl ods by requirin[: ( as he is ernpoHerccJ to 
do) tJ e Conmission to conduct an enquiry into the mercer or 
takeover and its lik:eJ.y effect on tl1e public interest . This 
provision autl orises suc1J a course of' action ,,·here Clause 60 does 
not apply (should this be ever established) provided that : 
(a) 'lhe :t-:inister considers that the 1,ierger or takeover T'la} be 
contrary to the public interest; and 
(b) 2L1 months has not elapsed since the merger . 
( These two criteria are the 1, ain limitations to the use 
of' tl is provision . ) 
epon the Commission findinp,- such a takeover , usinc; these 
methods , to b e contrary to tbe publ'Lc interest the Minister 
ma1, , irrespective of' ,:hether the takeover has res11lted in a 
monopoly or partial I"onopo J y , rrnJ~e an order in Council uncler 
Clause 56 (2) - one s11cli result that c;:in f'ollow f'rom sucl1 an 
order is the requiring of' its dissolution . 
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As rrentioned , the Australian .ler;islation has controlled 
takeovers effected hy tJ, esc met1 1ods wi tb !.;he l1Se of clear 
uneq11ivocal lanr-uar:c in Section 50 whiclt provides that a 
corporation shall not acquire dircctlv or indirectly any share 
in tl1.e capital , or any assets of a body corporat<' , ·whereas in 
'cu ealand the ef'fect is likely to have the reslllt of' 
subs tanti allJr lessenj ng competition . le , in e-w ealand , await 
judiclaJ interpretation for tbe final ans,-ers . 
Critic is1:' of' Section 50 
'!wo principal cr:i.ticisrr1s can be levelled against Section 
50 . Fjrst it lays down no opportunity for the est~blishment 
o:f cuidelines to detern.ine whether a mer~er has anti - competitive 
ef.fects . 
.f .""....:.. f 1ergers provide opportunities for p9FG9RG to fro~ , diversi y 
and achieve econor1ies in production and distribution , all o.f 
,,hich have pro - cor11peti ti ve ei'fcc ts . The advantages of' mergers 
are countered by the present uncertainty in the Australian 
legislation ~11ich can preclude this developnent . erv.er 
r,1..1idelines which have been sucgcsted by one writer ( 12) similar 
to those issued by the Departnent of Justice in the Inited States 
would help to renove the uncertainty in the application of the 
r ,err;er law . J . Levine sugr;ests tliat rather than spec-Lfy r,uidelines 
there sh.ould be F,eneral poJ icy statements in the legislation , and 
tl1c administrative authorities sl1ould then issue clear and 
specj.fic r1ereer w1idelines delineatine enforcement policies . 
'The ·h·ri ter considers that of more help would be rec;ular publication 
of clearances , authorizations , and rejections , with reasons for 
the dee is ions . 
( 1 2) Jane R . 
1 97 J L17 
, evine "Aspects of the 'I'rade 
A. L . J . 679 at p . 704 
rac tices ,il l" 
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Secondly , 6ection 50 does not provide for any "failing" 
co11.pany de:fenc e; tliis is also a critic isr1 that can be made 
of' the correspondinr,- Tew / ea] and le{;islation and this question 
is ,rnrthy of examination hy both C' overnments . t hether such a 
defence ,dll be read in by the Court remains to be seen . 
'This defence , which requires the proof that suhstantial 
and unsuccossi' ul er.forts were made to sell the failinc coP1pany 
to a non- co~peti tor , ·was first recoe;nized in the Lni ted States 
in t h e ~ n ternational Shoe case ( 1 J) . 
available if' the company ' s resource 
Today this de.f'ence is only 
arc so depleted that a 
reorc;anization is not possible , and if' it is established that 
the acquiri.ng company is the only available purchaser . 
ut the main stren~th of' Section 50 lies in attackinG 
questionable fl1er Gers Lefore completion by requi.ring pre- merger 
notif'ication . F or tl1e American experience has shown that i ~ is 
very clif'f'icul"t , costly and time consuminr; (1L~) to undo a mer[;er , 
and during the course of such litieation there is nothing in 
tlie present , et to stop the acquiring f'irm f'ro11 strippi.ne the 
acquired f'ir11 oi' its key assets and rnana 0 ·ement personnel rendering 
divestiture , if ordered , of the acquired :firm as a viaJle entity 
unlikely . F'j nally , even if divestiture is achieved , the 
American experience demonstrates (15) that it is unlikely to 
prove a succcssf'ul remedy . 
( 13) 
( 1 lt ) 
( 1 5) 
(1930) 280 S P291 a horizontal acquisition was upheld 
on the £_rounds that one of tl1e rnergin t' f'irms was " a 
corporation with resources so depleted and the prospect 
of rchal,ili tat ion so remote tli at it f'ac ed tLe e-rave 
probabili t_, of' business failure . " 
See : ader Study roup : The Closed .C:nterprise System 
(197 1 ) p . 657 at p . 709 for examples . 
::,ee ,lz i.nra "The An tir err;er J aw" ( 1 964) American ,, ournal 
or Lm·, of .!..!,con . p . l~J . 
reit and ..ulzinr;a 11 ruiti 'rust P enalties and Attitudes 
' ouards I,isk: An economic analysis" (1973) , 6 1 arv . L . 
Rev . p . 693 at pp6S5- G96 . 
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''lie ApproacL tal-::.en to the Control of' J ergers and Takeovers 
in J er '.:' ealand: 
The Australian lecislation 011ly conder11ns anti-competitive 
mer;-ers , a sirnilar approac'1 has been adopted in J\ ew ealand; 
a merger ,1ill he allowed so lone as it is not contrary to the 
public interest . l ergers and talceovers have of'ten in t:b e past 
been seen as the royal road to nonopoly and as such , distrusted; 
nevertheless mercers play an ii1portant place in t'1e modern 
business world . The benefits that often result fror:1 . ucc essful 
r1ergers include 1nore efficient use ol' resources through the 
rationalization o:f production :facilities and marketine; 
arrangements; a savjnc; oi' nan power; facilities for improved 
research a11.d development , resultinc; in the introduction of new 
techniques and Jm.01:-1 ho,·, , with tbe possibility of lover prices 
for t:1e consumer as a result of the cost economies achieved . 
If . orah sums up the advantages well ·when he Frote (16) "The 
fear or a possible takeover bid is one o:f the nost e.ffectivo 
inducer10nts to the managers o:f a small f'irr. continually to make 
the best use of its resources. A contested bid is likely to incrmse 
efficiency , 1.iliether or not it is successful , for no one is likely 
to r1ake a bid unless he thinks he can malce more profit :from tlle 
exist in£' assets tl an can the present managers . 11 Secondly it 
must be remembered that I' o,v 7 caland is a country ·with a very 
snall internal :;1arket , and in many instances (e . g . i,attics and 
production of tinned foodstu:fi's) resources are put to better 
use i:f competition is linited . It is very much cheaper to make 
sane products in larcc plants that are in constant operation 
than jn mc:ny separate factories for the demand is not sufficient 
( 16) Valentine I ora1, "1 onopolles a restrictive practice" 
19GB ~ enpiun 'oaks at p . 69 . 
to ,,;arrant the expenditure on more than one or two plants big 
enon["h to achieve full economics oJ' scale • . atties is a good 
exar.1ple of' toleration by P arliarwnt of lirni ta ti ons on competition: 
it ,-1<1nts f'irms to rationalize and combine in units that are larcer 
t:i1a.n necessary to achieve all tt,e econonies tliat are possible 
at the plant level , since bif' firms can afford to spend lart;e 
SU'S on research and development . Tl•e sole supplier of a product 
enjoys a securer rnarlcet tl1an firms in more co ,peti tive industries 
and earns hir;her prof'i ts . The supplier is free to invest more 
in lone term projects of' researcl and development whicl , if 
successful , will ocnefit the consumer . Secondly , tl e ability o:f 
CH ea.land industry to compete on exnort markets ac:ainst J arr;e 
overseas ["iants demands tbe develop11ent of such monopolies . 
As mentioned , the aim of both the Australian and Ne,-: Zealand 
le~;islation is to ensure that the many advantae;es of mergers 
occur to t,,e public wi tl-:.out the t!'lany detriments that so often 
flow from a series o:f .erv,ers and tal-:eovers . 
ut a mer.o·er can have precisely the Yronc- effect if' executed 
solely to add the profit of' a small.er co 1pany to tl1ose o:f the 
larGer , or to remove a competitor , or to provide assets which 
cru, he stripped off' and sold for a valid pro:fit . Also , many 
o:f the undesiraL)lc :feat11res that :floH from a monopoly can also 
result f'ron a mercer or series o:f mergers • T11ese possible 
detriments r::ay 
.. .. 1 .. 1~ .... 
'i ' l 91(;)' as 1, e have seen , undue cone en tration of' 
econorric power in the .forr, of' 1 ,onopol: , 1:iarket d orninanc e or 
sheer acclomeration of resources , res11ltinP,' in the establis unent 
of' a point or no return in an industry so that the emergence of 
i'llture cor1pctj tars is e:f'f'ectivel_, proliibi tcd . Tl1e possibi.1i ty 
01' charl incr unduly ldr;l prices in relation to cost and cuality 
CE'rtainJy exists as does the possi.~ilit} of inadcqua.te research 
z 
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and development iI' there is no such inc en ti ve f'or it to taJ<.e 
place . 
In short , t ie aim of' the Australian legislation and the 
. cu 1.ealand Commerce ,ill (as it no,· stands) is to ensure that 
nerr;ers are completed f'or the coP1mon good , and a rer;ulatory 
method l1as been established to do this . 
Scher •e of' t 11e Co111merc e 'ill: Clause 59 , 60 , 60A- , 
61 , 65A , 66 and 67 . 
Clause 59 defines "a merger or takeover : as a transaction 
-which "results in any t,,o or more enterprises ceasing· to be 
distinct enterprises . " 
he i 1ethod o.f rec;ulation appears to t1e quite simple and 
eff'ective . Clause 60 provides that notif'ication shall e given 
to the I xaminer of' any proposed merger except those scl eduled b, 
Clause 60A . 
Clause 60 sets out those mereers to ~1ich Clause 60 does 
not apply . They include: 
completely alien conpanies; 
professional partnerships whose f'ees are fixed by 
leGislation; 
,,here the value o.r the assets of' all the enterprises involved 
is less than .,, 1, OOO , OOO or 1vhere the assets of' one of the 
companies involved is less than~ 100 , 000; and finally 
uhere one of' the parties is declared an overseas person 
·with no other sig71if'icant business interest in 1 ew r,ealand , 
and of course , where the Plerr·er is exempted . 
'lhe Lxaminer then ( under Clause 60) inf'orms the ,inister 
f'urnis11ine; him with a provis ionaJ report indic at inc; whether the 
rer~er is considered by the Exruniner to be in the public interest 
or not . 
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Tl e I inis ter has 35 days to consent , or if' his provisional 
ilo\ic:r«.;t 
view is that the mere-er is contrary to the "public ~ " require 
the Commission to inquire into it to determine whether it is 
contrary to the public interest as deI'lned in Clause 62 (supra . ) • 
.LI' consent is riven within 35 days or no notice is published 
ordering an enquiry , the merrer may e-o f'orward within twelve 
10nths of that date . 
Clause 61 governs the inquiry by the Jommission, ~1ich must 
report its i'indinc-s to the ~ inister within two months ( the 
parties 11ave a rirrht to a copy) . 
'inally under Clause 65 the 1.inister upon receiving the 
Commission ' s report , consents to the merger , or if' it is f'ound 
by the Corimission to be against tlie public interest , prohibits 
it or imposes conditions . The 1 inister can invite a conference 
Hitl1 the parties concerned co see if an ae;reernent cai1. be reached . 
Clause 60 '1 provides that where Clause 60 does not apply 
tlie i inister may sti 11 order an enquiry by the Commission if he 
considers it contrary to tlle public benefit , but he can ' t 
exercise this power if' two 1 •onths have passed since ..,he merger . 
nder Sub- section ( L:) where the Co1.nnission f'inds that the mercer 
or takeover is contrary to the public interest the· inister may , 
irrespective of' whether the merrer or takeover has resulLed in 
any r:ionopoly or partial monopoly , may make a:n order in council 
under Clause 56 requirine, amonp; other thin{'"s: 
1 . a perso11 to linr:L t the area of his business; 
2 . dispose of' his business in a certain area; 
or under Clause 65 ( 1) (b) prohibit the proposed 1,1crgcr or declare 
it to be unla,,rf·u1 and order its dissolution . 
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Clause 65A provides that it is an oJ':fence against the Act 
to be a party to a merr;er to 1·'hich Clause 60 applies and no notice 
is c-iven , it is an o:fi'ence to brcacl1 any of' the conditions imposed 
by t le inister . Clause 66 outlines the penalties :for a breach of 
Clause 60 and 65A . 
Cri tjc isr1 s 
CJ.a1·sc GOA provj.des tbat "dection 60 shall not apply in 
respect of' any merger i.J' ••• the assets of the enterprise 
• involved are less tl1cu1 ,,1 , 000 , 000 . ut no allowance is made f'or 
1 i.ahili ties ,·.'hich create a totally artif'icial situation. 
Secondly , this figure requires close exa.r.1ination as was pointed 
out by the Stock Exchange Association in the context of' present 
rates of' inflation . f 17) They pointed out that annual rates o:f 
inf'lation of 10 to 15$" menn that ( on the 1 S'i; rate) 1974 currency 
uill buy about i'ive times the assets that the same amount of' 1985 
currency will buv . I o provision is made for this very real 
problem . 
I o,,, mere si7e alone can ever b e contrary to the public 
interest is beyond t c writer , for it is only the way that the 
po,,er represented hy that si7,e is used that can be bad , and needs 
control . ~ Ech co1. ld be learned by tlie lecislaturc by exai'1ining 
the E • .., . c . approacl of' taJ.,:.ine; turnover rather than assets value 
as the critical determinant as to the need f'or noti:fica tion of' 
transactions leadinc to a "concentration" (the .0 . ~. c . equivalent 
of a mero-er) . F'or by u jnc. turnover one can look at the potential 
effect of' tl,c meri:;er (ratlJer than just speculatinc at tl1e possible 
percentaFe of the market that rroup could control based on its 
assets value or size) in a posit-Lve and unmistaking Fay . 
( 17) S11b11ission on the Commerce ·j 11 
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~or turnover shows the ability to control a market by 
provLd j ng the Co11m:Lss ion ,,:i th actual numbers of' units or r,-oods 
t 1 1e new {'Toup ·vill produce . 
','he 1; . L . C . Commission has dee icled that there will be no 
concentration (a concentration occurs where an undertaJ-inc has 
acquired the po11er to hinder ei'fec ti.ve coPJpeti tion in the Conman 
, arkct) wbero the goods or services produced by the concentration 
clo not account in any nember state for ,1ore than 25
1 
o.f the 
turnover in identical oods or services ,-:hich due to their price 
or characteristics may lie regarded as similar by the consumer . 
A second cri ticis1r. is tbe probJ.eP1 of the considera' le time 
involved in an application .for consent . 
The same car1 be said of the AL stralian procedure for 
obtainin.':'· an aui,1 ori7,ation or clearance but the lcncth of' time 
i.1.volved is considerahly shorter , f or e.'a.J ple Section 95 dealinr; 
with Clearances of' .cre;ers provides that tJ1e Co1'lmission has JO 
days after receivinF notice of' a proposed merper , to determine 
,hether it will su1)staJ1ti2lly lessen competition and if' no 
notice of' the decision :is rece.i.Yed hy the parties ,dtLin JO 
cla~rs t11eir proposal is assuncd to have been approved of' . 
"he time taken has been cnt back consiclerabl~r , but husiness 
opporLtu1ities do not wait . 'l'l1 crc is a 35 clay period given to 
tle examiner af'ter noLice of' a proposed f'1erfer is {"i.vcn for 
r.onsideration of tl1e application . If 111.co11ditio11al consent is 
.!!2.1 given , a f'urtller period of up to f'our nonths is occupj cd by 
ai inauir_ , and t 1.e ! inister has a rurther one .on th in rhich to 
r-iakc the :f'inaJ decision - a total of' over six rnontlis . 
Only time will tell whether tl ls 1.cnrth of' time i.nvolved in 
o' tainin, consent proves to be an i.nhibitin{" factor forrm.ny 
bene:fic i al r ercers . 
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The realities oi' this problem cru1 be illustrated by a memo 
c.ircuJ.atcd to stock11olders of the • cw 1/caland {ef'ricerating Co , 
f'roi 1 tl1 c Soutl!J.cmd •'rozcm : eat Co . Jt pointed out that S . I' . T .' s 
o.ff'er oi' arcJ-i 1L~th 1975 (uhicil provided f'or acceptarce by" . , . • F~ . 
s tockholrlcrs by JOt 1 t pril 197 5) ,, as conditional on the consent o.f 
u, e • in Ls ter oi' Ar;ri cuJ turc 011d 1,'i.sheri es under Section 7 J of tl.e 
eat Act 1964 1vli-i eh provides that consent o:f the ,inister is 
required f'or the acquirinc- of an interest in an export slaughter-
l·ouse . .,_ho , inistcr 's consent had not been e;iven by this later 
elate and due to the delay of over nine weeks Southland rozen 
eat i'ound itself f'orced to withdraw its offer made on the 
14th I arch . (18) 
Thirdly , ini t_Lation is left to the .inister , a i'cature abse..nt 
~. 
f'rorn !;he Lustralinn . lt i.s the writer ' s view that tlle following 
reasons this is the 11orc desirable c1pproac 1 • rLhcre is SOl'lC 
danc.-er that po·1 itical motivation rni;rht prevent cases comine 
before the Co1:1missi on , but this is to a certain degree balanced 
by the :fact that there must be a sortinc., house and it is felt 
tl·at the department should have this job :for it acts as the public 
representative . Any,,ay, if 1,e arc to be c-uided by events in the 
ni ted i inc-dom , the merc;ers ·whictl deserve rcportinc- wil 1 be few 
and obvious to tl1e public at large . 
~·o· 0 >OL'i : .. , .u.• 0 
P It1 C 
CW REGl LATim 
'Phis is ac11ievecl by one main section: 
Trade ractices \et 1 97l1 . 
I .. A STPALlA 
Section 46 of the 
Southland 1 ro zen ,eat on tli c 16th une made a new o:f:f er 
and were i'acecl 1d t. Lhe expense of repcatinG the process 
ag·ain . 
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Section Lr6 makes it clear that it docs not prevent normal 
competition by enterprises that are big by taking advantage of 
ccono1 1 ies of scale or rnaJ·ing full sc of such skills as they 
have; the provision will prohiui t an enterprise ,,hieh is in 
a position to control a market fror.1 taking advantac;e of its 
market power to e.Liminate or harm j ts co1:1peti tars . 
The i.e,-1 ,Jcaland ler;islature has adopted a similar approach 
of requiring the Commission to report to the 1 inister on the 
public benefit ( or lack of it) of any fl'lonopoly or partial 
11011opoly that is referred to that body by the inister . The 
,,·ord partial monopoly in the ,-:ri ter I s opinion , will lead to 
dif~iculties , and a better phrase would be 'near nonopoly ' 
,dd.ch more accurately describes the situation outlined in the 
definition of ' partial monopoly' in Clause 2 . 
Section l16 nrevents a corporation "in a position to 
substantially control a 1narket f'or goods or services II from 
cnc-ae;ing in conduct "to eliminate or harr.1 a cornpeti tor , prevent 
entry of a person into the market , or deter or prevent a person 
from engac-inr; in col'1peti tive behaviour in that market or in 
another market . 
'ihe ':'est in ~ection /16 .for 1 onopolization 
A p-ood example of the kind oi' conduct Section /.j.G is aimed 
at was c-iven by .Senator 1 nrphy o.f a person in a position to 
control a market , usine- his pouer as a doninant purchaser of' 
c;oods to cause a supplier oi' those coods to refuse to supply 
then to a competitor o.f hi1:1 , excludinc- him 1'rora cornpetinc 
e.ffcc ti vely . 
The standard or test of rwnopolization is that o.f 
"substantial control" llich allo,,s f'or sorneLhinc:: less than 
absolute 1,1onopoly po,,er . The same can be said of' Clause 55 
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of' the c onm•erce i ill wl1icl1 e1"?po1,ers tile inister to require the 
Cor11ission to conduct an enquiry and report to him as to any 
circurnstnnces tending to brine- about a complete or partial 
monopoly , or w ether there exists in ~\ew ealand or any part o.f' 
c,! L calaud any complete or partial 1,1onopoly . (This last phrase 
substru1.tially increases the a11bit of' coverace of this clause . ) 
'"his vas a u:i sc rnovc on the part of' both lceislaturcs for 
instances of' pure 11:onopoJy are rare and it is possible .for a 
firm to a:fi'ect the functionin.,,. o.L a market or to create its own 
conpctitive environment with less than absolute monopoly power . 
A similar approach ·.ras adopted in the b . E . C . via Article 86 of 
the ,,on1e Treaty (prcventinc; 11 abusive exploitation of a dominant 
position in the Co1.1mo11 } arl;:et by one or more en tcrpris cs) dc.finin{; 
doi.'inant uos i tions as the ability of' a i'irm to behave over a 
period of time in a diLfcrcnt manner than a firi.1 in a Horkably 
co11pctitive 1iarkct would behave if' it faced the sane cost and 
dcnancl conditions . (19) . 
Tn Continental Can it ,-:as held "undertakings are in a 
dor,j nant position 11hen tliey i1ave the pouer to behave independently , 
1vllicll puts then in a position to act ui tl'out taking into account 
their competitors , purchasers or s1mpliers . ·~1at is the position 
wf1cn , bee a.use of' their sllarc of the rnarl·et co11bincd wi Ll1 the 
ava.Llablli ty of technical kno,-;led n c , raw materials or capital , 
they have the paver to ctcterminc pr·i cos or to control production 
or distribution i'or a s i.,-,1if le ant part o.f the product in question . 
"l1is po,Tcr does not necessarily have to derive from an absolute 
cl omina tion • • • but it is enouf;h that they be strong cnou(;ll as a 
whole to ensure to those unclerta.kinr;s an overall independence of 
:)chav lour . 
( 1 9) ( 1972 1 Co11non .. arket Lau kcvie1,' 11 at p . 27 . 
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Covera~e o~ Section 46 
J a.ne {. Levine ( 20) noted that the of'fenc e of' monopolization 
can have b-.ro quite distinct aspects . On the one hand it na~r be 
concerned uith abusive conduct , i . e . witb preventinp: a firm -with 
marl;:et po1,:cr i'ro1.) usint its strene,th to deter or destroy 
competition . Or nonopoly nay be concerned 1,ith market structure 
s-Lnce Lhe nere existancc of a 111onopoly may be enou.r· 1 to cause 
the marl;:et to behave in an anti.-competi tive :fashion as outlined 
earlier . 
Section 116 only covers the former aspect . 
Section 46 states a corporation j w s fsctic ~ ... shall not 
to.kc advantarre of' tllo power in relation to that P1arket it has 
hy virtue of bcin,~ in that position - to act in such a uay as 
to G.Chieve the prescribed results 011tlj ned in Section l.J6 ( 1) 
(a) - (c) . 
o a.ttonpt is made to define the type o:f conduct prollib.L tod 
but certainly the pract-ices forbidden 1"1y Sections Lt5 , l.J7-50 and 
such unfair practices as coercive refusals to deal , predatory 
prlcint , discriminatory treatment of' customers and consciously 
clepr i vi.nr cor'"peti tars of sourc os of supply, ·.:ill pro bab.ly be 
prohibited . 
Section ltG could also be read so as to cover "lep;itinate " 
conduct suc1; as consc Lous expansion into a nc1-; arl·et opportunity , 
even the P'!aintenance oI' low· prices mi{';l 1 t he suspect for by 
conscious1y ma:Lntain:Lne· 101,- prices a monopolist wil.l successfully 
c.liminate competitors . J.n short tl e pro )lcrn is to 11a.intain the 
fine line between honest conduct 1:hicl, should be encouraeed and 
exclusionary cond11c t 1d1-Lcl should be preveJJ ted . 'J'l e f'arr1ous .Alcoa 
c as c is an ex anp 1 c ( 2 1 ) ( See _ pp end ix A) . 
(2c) -spccts of Trade Practices il1 (1973) L!7 1t . L . , 1 • C.79 at p . 690-
701 







1.• in ally a number o.f critic ·isms can he r1ade o:f Sect ion 46 
and this cuts back tl1e scope of' the section compared to Section 2 
o.f the .-,hcrrnan Act w :icl1 encompasses three additional sorts of 
offence - the acquisition of nonopoly power with intent , the 
attcr:1ptod or unsuccess:fu.l acquisition of 110nopoly power and 
co1'111inat·ions/conspiracies to "11onopolize" in this sense . 
P . ax:t ancl runt (22) have posed a n1.,11,1her of' questions , 
in relation to Section 46 (1) (a) which will need to be resolved . 
)oos Sect ion l.J.6 ( 1 ) ( a) mean that discount houses , if they are 
doLlinant ~ir s , arc obliged to ref'rajn rrom enterine into shopping 
areas? or that supermarkets enjoyin,.,. economies of scale should 
not price low? or that the dominant f'irm in an industry r.msL so 
conduct -i. tself' as to establish a protective umbrella :for any 
f'rince i'irns that c'loose to exist? 
Secondly as pointed out by ,Jane R . Levine (23) those who 
11ave already acliicved. J'1onopoly posi_ tions relyin;o- on the very 
practices no1v condcrmcd are protected by the ~1.ct to the extent 
that the ' do not henceforth enr;age -Ln prohibi tecl conuuct . 
JJfhT VJI - Authorizations and Clearances 
Tn this part of the Act provision is made f'or optional 
clearar1ces on the basis of the absence of' the likelihood or any 
ef'fcct of' substantiaJ lesscninF of' competition (:::>ection 92(2)) and 
for authorization by ref'crence to a sir,1ilar test or "s11bstantial 
benefit to the public" Section 90 (5) . As r entioned previously an 
applicatjon for c1earance is essentially a request for clarif'ication 
ol' the anti - co11pctitive standinr; ol' some proposed conduct . An 
applj_cation for .::i.utllorization is a request for a "public interest" 
determination . 
(21) Supra note 5 at p . 22 . 
22) Supra note 20 at p . 709 . 





Clearance is availai)le :for rnerr.;ers onlv (section J (a)) 
but not for "monopolization" as def'ined in Section lJ6 (Section 
Once a clearance has been applied .for by a 
corporation Section 9li provides that the Commission may ri thin 
JO days "e-ive notice in ,vriting to the corporation stating 
whe tlwr or not t],e Co• 1P1ission considers that the proposed 
acquisition would be likely to have the e.ff'ect of' substantialJy 
lesseninr, corripoti tion in a market for g·oods or services" . 
Ji' the Co1,.111ission gives no notice within JO days the P1erger 
is automatically cleared (Section 93 (J)) . lt should also be 
noted that there is no provision for extending the JO days , 
even by ac;reer:,en t . 
\.t the outset it must be acknowledged that the great 
advantae;e of a clearance is that of certainty bef'orohand , but 
a number of cri ticis111s can be 111ade against the clearance 
provisions as tbey now stand • 
./\. clearance once rranted , e;ives protection for all time . 
nlike an authorization , a clearance is .f'inal and unconditional , 
and as T- rof' . ") 
. ' . art and ; • runt point out , on the o tlJ er hand 
an author·i zation can be !'Jade wi tb or without conditions , limited 
or unlimited as to til'le; and subject to revocation on c-rounds 
of' false or misleadi_ne,; i.nf'ormation , non- coP1pliance of couditions , 
or o:f a 1·1aterial change or circumstances . 
1- s mentioned tile main advanta~e oi' a clearance is that or 
certainty , out is it.; rather no 11orc than. a hollow shell'/ The 
test to be applied by the Coirimission in r;rantin[; a clearance is 
that it shall not e-rant a clearance if' it considers !;hat "an 
e.f'.f0.c t ••• r'1ay be substantially to 1 ssen conpeti tion or to tend 
to res11lt in a person bcint; in a position substantialJy to control 
<1. 1 arkct :for c;oods or services . " o further r,uidance is of'fered 
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as to the rneaninc o.f the standard it is to e .. ploy . There is no 
provision i'or publication of reasons for decisions , so no 
g-uiclance will l,e o:ff'ered to the business conunw1.ity as to what 
riteria it has eMployed . 
l•'inally , with the c-rantin(" of' an order capable o:f such far-
reachinF consequences will not the Co~1ission be most wary of 
grantinr; a clearance to a nerc;er of' any si~i:ficance? 
Authorizations (Sections 88- 91) 
Th e Commission r.iay , upon application by a corporation , 
i:;rant an authorization to the cornoration to 11ake an acquisition 
of shares or assets that mirht otheruise contravene Section 50 . 
In the case o:f an applicatio:r for an authorization the 
Conmission is required to apply a different set of' criteria 
:fron that appJied by the Court in detcrmininr,- i·!hether ru1 of ence 
11 as been conmi tted . Section 90 (51 sets out a "public interest 
test" . 
The r.;rar.t of' an authorization thus depends on proof of' a 
substantial benefit to the public 0einr- a benefit that would 
not other,,i.sc he available . 
Simple as it may sound , it .Ls particularly di.f:ficul t in 
t 11 e case of' a merger to demonstrate i'uture benei'its and even 
uore clif'ficul t to de1·10nstrate that this benei'i t ,rnulcl not 
ot1·, erwise be available . 
In seekinc· to de1!lonstrate that a mercer Hill produce 
ei'f'ic ienc ics ul t ima tcly bencfi.tt inf the public tlie Cor.u;iiss ion 
could look at !;his question on the basis oi' reasonable 
pro½abilities ratller tl1a11. positive certainties , i'or if' the 
1Jenefits clicl not occur , the Commission could revoJ.'c the 
authorization 011 the .o-ro1,nd s 01' a "subsequent material chanr;e 
of circumstances" . (Section 91 (4) (b) . ) 
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As rnen tioned , the 1.1ore clif':ficul t task is to demor1s trate 
that this bene:fi.t ,.,nuld not otherui.se be available and probably 
l;hc Commission ,,ill interpret this rcquj renent as r 1eaninF nothing 
more than requirinc, proof' that the claimed benef'i t could not 
practicably be obtained by methods less restrictive of 
coripetition, than those proposed . ·cut despite tl1 ese possible 
areas o.f d·ifficulty there is at .least one advantace of' the 
authorization procedure as it no,· stands , that oi' certainty . 
';'he publicction oi' reasons i'or decisions ,,ill establish e,rt.1idelines 
:for businesses - the clarification of' ,vhat is lawful and unlawful , 
and at its best; it wi.11 ensure clarity of' tliouc;ht , fairness and 
consistency between cases . 
T E cm r EHCE ILL Sec L·i..ons 55- 1J8 (. onopoly) 
1~s ,,:ith the A1 1stralian Act , the 1 ill as it now stands docs 
not l,ccin ass uni nc- that size :is bad , "or 
(a) clause 55 requires that the existence o:f a r10nopoly he 
sllo,.rn; and 
(b) that. Lt he sllown to l>e ac,ainst the p 'Jlic interest in 
tcrr1s of' Cl211sc 62 , i . e . in clecidinc· this question , rerard 
shall :ie had to tl'e provisions o·[ CJ.a11se 17 11 and any 
econoriic or other effects ,.;lt.Lch c:my suclt r,1onopoly ••• is 
likely to 1•ave •.• ,.,:Jiclt wo11ld not take place in the 
a½sence of~ e monopol) . 
ln short tl1 e Comrl"ission ·is asked to decide :"Juel~ tl e sane 
thin{" as is tl e Corml:Lssion 01 the Aus-f.raJiar1 ler;islation , 
1vhether a co11pany ·is in a posit·ion sulistantially to control a 
riar1:et or the s11pp.ly or any coocls or servic,es. 
ut , as prcvlo 1sl_· stated , tl e test for the <1.ctnal o:C.fencc 
o:f r ionopo Lizat. ion in ,\ustral i a is whether Llle cor1pany is activE ly 
ex loitinr· its posit-Lon ,dth "i.ntent to achieve the prohibited 
J 
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results as outlined in Section L~G (1) (a) - (c) o.f t.hat Act , ,,-bile 
the test in F ew Zealand is 1.11lcther the situation benc.fits the 
public o.f :r: ew ~ ea] and . 
As ,-;ith the Australian legislation , the Col'111ercc ... ,ill as it 
now stands has r.:oved away -Cror a quantati ve (established when an 
arbitrary percentar;e of the marl:ct is reached) to a qualitative 
definition of nonopoly (e . v . f'rom 1/3 market in the old AustraJian 
Act) to hein[' in a pos5tion to control a rrarket of any roods or 
services . 
I u t the Co1YJ1rierc e ill as it now stands has one P1ain 
advantaf·e over the ,u1stralia11 \et , for left untonclled in 1 ustra·lia 
are positions of' market dominance ti1at have been acl ieved during 
the Australian laissez- i'air period of' trade practice rec;ulation . 
'l'lJ osc who have already achieved rrionopoly posit ions , in part by 
relyinF on the very practices now condemned , arc protected by the 
Act to the extent that they do not continue to engage in prohibited 
conduct . ls Lt eno11gh :for the purposes of' tlds type of legislation 
to allow a nonopoly as long as 5t docs nothine Lo increase its 
power? ln the Hritcr's opinion the answer nust be no , for the 
public r:ius t bear the costs of hic;ller prices , reduced ol'tput , 
inefficiencies , and lack oi' iriova tion so often re.f.l ec ted in a ,, 
rnonopoly situation . Also le.ft untouched by the Australian 
legislation as it now stands arc tbe existinG' oJ ic-opolies - a small 
nu Lor of f'irr,1s do1 Jina tine an industry with hic;h 1Jarriers to 
entry may approximate the conduct of' a monopolist . As 1 • 1urner 
points out 11 ,oth situations arc characterised hy an absence of 
viG'orous price co1~1peti tion , Hider price/cost margins than would 
exis L under ef':fec t i ve conpeti t ion , pro tee tion ol' incffic ien t firms 
and a consequent misallocation o.f econoriic resources ." 
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'L'he J\4e·w Zealar1d answer of· allo,,rine; monopoly while they can 
prove public benef'it , somethinG which will be no easy taskl,i and 
oi' keepinr;- control over the monopoly hy vigilant rc- exarnlnation 
ensures the reverse ·will occur , .for r,ana("erial skills , and 
researc11 arc encourac·ed by allowing 11atural growth in an enterprise 
resul tine in lower prices i'or the consumer . 
etliod of' er;ulation adopted in Clavses 55 - 58 . 
Clause 55 
'1he 11inister or 'l'rade and lndustry r1ay require the 
...:onriission to conduct an enquiry into monopolies , partial 
1°onopolics or olir;opo.lics , and report Lo him whetlier there 
exist: ln Nei·l L,ealand or in any pa.rt o.f , cw 2'ealand any of 
the above , and secondl_· any circumstar,ces tendinf; to any of 
these , and u11der Section 55 ( 1) (1)) require a decision as to 
tl1e public l)enef'i t of' such monopoly once sLown to cxls t . 
Clause 56 
( 1..1tlines the action the ovcrnor-c eneral in ouncil , a.y take 
on the recomr 1cnclation of the . inister f'ollo,-,inr; a.11 enquiry under 
ClallSG 55 . 1 t sl,oulcl be noted they are very wide ru1d :far rca.chin0 
ra.ncin-; f'ror 1 reqv.irine a person "to rcs Lric L or lirli t his 
LJusj_ness to a certain area" to requirinc a person to Lake such 
actjon as the Covernor General thinks .fit . 
A starl contrast to the Austra.lia11 approach oI' a.llowinc; 
s i tua. tions of' narke t dor·iinanc c and con tro 1 Lo ex.Ls t so lonr, as 
t:~e dominant f'irr1(s) rcf'ra.ins fro, engat inr; in certain prohihited 
cond11ct . 
Claiise 57 
.,.JJows tile, Lnistcr to exercise otl1cr actions , authorised 
b, Clause 56 ( 1) i'or tl o purposes o.f L11at Clause . 
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Clause 58 
inally Clause 5& makes it an o[f'ence for any person to 
"contravene or fail to cor1ply Pith any ordc r in council made 
under Section 56 or by the r inister under Section 57 . 11 Fines 
are imposed thouch no prosecution may be bef;un without the 
~ inister ' s consent . 
'I\C\.J 
ill ,... stancls it is sui1bi tted ~ tl1ere is one glaring 
weekness - lea.vine the ·word r ,onopoly as an undei'inecl term in 
tb e t' ill . Surely in a r ill 1d1ich requires a qualitative test 
to be used some indication shovld be f;iven of the factors to be 
vsed and taken into account and of tl1e approprinte Heiv.ht to 
he eiven to them . There are questions of economic analysis , 
and of opinion as to the ef'fect on cornpeti tion to be answered , 
more aid should 1-ie given to the CoP1mission in findine- them . 
Jt is suGeested that a non - exhaustive list be prepared of crjteria 
as in the case of deterrninint; the pubJjc benefit , outlined:i.n 
Clause 17 . . et both partial monopol ' and o ligopoly are def'ined . 
As mentioned the definition of partial monopoly is a poor one , 
for it docs not cover successi'ully the area i .t was intended to 
cover and by reason of' tbe artJl)i{;l1i ty serves only to c onf'use the 
iss1.1e . 
The def'ini tion of Oli,ropoly is F,encral bt1t this r'1ay he to its 
advantap-e , f'or the definition may inc]ude conbinations "\-110 by 
arrreerient cover the 1;1arket . The phrase "small number of 
enterprises " must be r.-eneral to cover all situations since 
relativity is crucial in ~1is area . ut some di:fficulty mirrht 
,J c found in tllo def'ini tion of' ' narket ' :itself' . .ls this market 
to be both ror iona1 and national? and is the warke L to be judged 
in tori ,1s of' a product . See f'or exanple the Cellopl1ane Cas e (23) 
(23) 35 1 CS . 377 
\/1,....T"""'nl A I I .. IJ\l,..l"\r1"'9"''1.I -I'"' ,.,.,.., I tl. , ___ 1., 
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,-,hi eh hi ~111 igl1 ts tlie pro blcP1s the l'n:i tod S tatos have experienced . 
n that case tl1e issue was s 1011ld the r1arkct be jurlrrecl in terms 
of' bottles rather tlwn { lass or in packac-in{" rat'ler t11an bottles . 
Secondly , r:J.ause G2 (l'ulJJic Jnterest) merely states that ·in 
dcterrtini.n~· ulletlier tbe existence of' any co1 plate or partial. 
nonop oly ••• or any proposed n1 cr{'er or takeover i s lil·ely to b, 
contrary to the }JUb1ic interest re{ ard shall be had not onl_, to 
t;1c provisions of' Sect ion 17 ( uhicl Ji sts tlte proven de Lrimen ts 
resul tine f'ron the above prac ticf's) II but also to any economic 
or otl er o.ffects v Li eh an_, such r1onopoly or 1.1er;er is l j_kely to 
h "ve on the wc11- bci.nr- of 1 e : ealancJ and 1·hicl1 uould not take 
p 1 ace in the abs enc c of' r'lonopo 1 y . 11 : o such list of the resu.l ts 
of' such practices ,;,rhich t 1,e C overnrie1 t considers to be in the 
pub]ic interest exists . 
For this provision ls one o-C ti1P. key clauses to the successf'ul 
control of' monopolies and mere ors , f'or l t provides an escape 
route w11ic 1 depends upon proof' of' 11 economic ei'f'ec ts lJy the 
etpplicant ,-,hich 1:ovld not take place ln the absence o:f' Lbe monopoly" 
at present 011ly the detri1.1ents are listed , but not the potential 
bene:fits . St cb a list cot1 Jd be alon[ th0. line of' those -Ln tl e 
{ nl tccl : in{dor I whic 1 include t!Jn .followi nc- bene:fi ts: 
(a) economics of' scale , 
(b) r10re ei'f'icient use of' resources tllro f:il t 1e rational i :,;at ion 
of' prod 1 ctioP J'acilities and I'larl·etinr" arrnnr-e1wnts , 
( c) a sav.in[" o:f 111aJ1po1:cr , 
(u) facilit Les 1·or increased export c111cl the open.in{~ up of new 
mc1rkcts; nnd al lied to t'1is 
( e) fac il it· es f'or reduction o.f 111ports; 
(i') introduction OJ' n01-1 tec1 niques and l~now ho\ , and improved 
i'acil:i.ties forir.iprovect research and development . 
(c) {;rec.ter ran{e of' products .for tllc consw,1er and possible 
,1,,,,....,"9"'-n1 • I•• 11,,r,.,.,,..,_..._1 -- " , 1 _,, ,a·---· . 
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l o,ver prices .for the consumer clue to !;he cost economies 
achieved . 
co 
The advan taces of' the Cor 1merce lJ.l are best appreciated 
by hlc;hlir;h tine the weaknesses of' the Australian lq~is lat ion . 
'l'hose firms ·:hich have reached and achieved monopoly positions 
by rclyi.nr; on the practices now condemned are protected by the 
A1 stralian Act to the extent t1 at they do not continue to enr,-a{"e 
in s1..1c'' conduct . It is quite possible that this r!ay eff'ectively 
foreclose the development of I'uture competition and f'or the time 
bcinp at least , the '\ct's I'ail.11re to attaclr ·firms in such a 
dominant positions means that it is the publjc ,vho must bear 
the costs of' hig-her prices and the closely related vices of 
reduced output and lack of' innovr>tion that history shows are so 
often characteristic of a monopoly situation . 
The same cc1m1ot be said of the Co111merce ,ill .for Clause 55 
enpowcrs the r inis ter to attacl· these undes irabJ e results , by 
rcquirint:, the Co1111lission to conduct an enquiry at anytime ns to 
the existence of anf monopoly , partial monopol,r or oligopoly . 
Secondly the o.ff'cncc of' monopolizatjon in Australia depends 
on ,vhetber the company is actively exploi tine; its position 
·pith jntent . There are c-rave cliff' ic u.l t ios associated ,·i th 
er.1asculating a large enterpr:i se by requirinG' it to clo notl1 i.ng 
to increase its share of the market . 'l'his will encoura~e a 
stagnant market ancl ine:ff'icient production . Is it enoucill for 
the purposes of this type of lceislat-Lon to alloH a monopoly as 
long as it docs nothing to increase its power The writer thinks 
not . '_he danl,ers to :the r>1arl·et associ.ated with merely la.vine; 
reached such a position arc as SP.riovs as those associ.ated with 
i.nc reasi ng an tj - colllpet ·i tivcness . rt'he t.ew L.ealand method of' 
,,, ........... ,..,,." ........ ,,,.. .... ,., ... ,., -- .. . 1_, • ... ·---·. 
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rcc;ttlation adopts a siriilar approach in that the Commission 
is asked to decide r:111c•1 the same thin~ as the Cor1rlission of the 
Australian lecislation: vhetl1er a co11pany is in a position to 
snbstantiaJ.ly control a market or the supply o.f any goods or 
services . nut the test -for the actual o.f:fence of rnonooolization 
is dif.fercnt , and docs not involve the question whether the 
Company is actively exploiting its position but rather as to 
whether tl1e situation bcnef'i ts the pubJ.ic of' ~.ew z.eaJ.and . This 
approacl-t o-r allowinc monopoly iI' public bcnefi t is proven 
overcomes the above 1,ientioned dif'f'.icul ties of the 1 ustra1ian 
metllod of' regulat.Lon; and ensures manacerial and productive 
skills are encourar:cd b-y alJ.owin.n; natural crowth o.f enterprises 
while at the same time tl e prof'i ts ,.,i J 1 be distributed to the 
nation as a whole t]1rouc;h lo,,er prices or increased exports . 
In short the Ne,, Zealand le[;islation leaves no room for a company 
to rest on its laureJs or established riarkct power . 
C,onc erninr; the contra 1 of 1:1ercers , the Australian 
legislation only condemns anti-cor,1peti tive rner[;ers . The 
,,eakness o:f its approach is that rnerc-ers vsually l~ave some 
loss welcomed aspects d,icb may include Joss o:f jobs and 
employment in a rer·ion - a common result o:C rationa l.iY.ation . 
Size docs 1,ot always ensure the lJest a] location and most 
e:f.ficient use of resources: f'or Llte snaller business unit 
\vhen threatened by nn un,.;elco1 c rnerr,er is .forced to 11ti] ize 
its resourc cs a,,ay fror.1 product ion to f'ic-h t it . 
In 1 cw ealarnl , the pu·1 lie in tcrcs t test as outlined in 
Clause 67 enables tJ1c ~or~mission and u1 timatcly t e 1, inister to 
veir-11 up all benei'i ts and determ iJ1ru1ts of' a proposed merger before 
author izinc its co - ahead . 
\ll"T'"""' 4 11 .. 11\/~"""rl .... '\I -- ,. ,_ ,_, 1 ,,., ___ o., 
(i) APl-' h1 DL{ I 
Alcoa until 1909 was a la1vf'ul and passive beneficiary 
o:f a monopoly in tbe aluminiun inc·ot :f:i.eld . Af'ter Lhat it 
proeressjvely strengthened its narket position by rneetinr: 
every new market oDportunity :for the use of aluminium . 
L . S . s .c . decided that the expansion was conscious and 
provided evidence of' an intent to monopolise . 
II It was not i11cvita1Jlc tllat it s1i.ould always anticipate 
increases in denand for incots and be prepared to supply then . 
1' othinc conpellcd it to 1-·eep douhli.nf; and redoubling its 
capacity before others e11tered the :f'icld . It insisted that 
it never excluded competitors; buL Fe think o:f no more effective 
exclusion tba.J:1 pror;ressively to e1,1bra.cc each nc,, opportunity as 
it opened , and to f'ace every ne,-:corner ,dth ne,,: capacity already 
e;eared into a great organization having the advantaee or 
experience , trade connections and the elite o:f personnel 
Alcoa meant to keep and did keep that coP1plete ru1.d exclusive 
hold upon the in("ot mar]ret ,,!ith ,,hich it started . That was to 
r onopolise tl1at marl·et however innocently it otller,-rise 
proceeded . " 
• 
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